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Abstract—Proving that a cryptographic protocol is correct for
secrecy is a hard task. One of the strongest strategies to reach
this goal is to show that it is increasing, which means that the
security level of every single atomic message exchanged in the
protocol, safely evaluated, never deceases. Recently, two families
of functions have been proposed to measure the security level of
atomic messages. The first one is the family of interpretation-
functions. The second is the family of witness-functions. In this
paper, we show that the witness-functions are more efficient than
interpretation-functions. We give a detailed analysis of an ad-hoc
protocol on which the witness-functions succeed in proving its
correctness for secrecy while the interpretation-functions fail to
do so.
Index Terms—Cryptographic protocols, interpretation-
functions, secrecy, verification, witness-functions.
I. INTRODUCTION
A cryptographic protocol is an encrypted communication
between at least two agents. This messages’ exchange is
governed by a set of rules dictated by the protocol. The purpose
of designing protocols using cryptography is to ensure the
security of this communication, since it is always supposed to
be executed in a hostile environment. In such insecure network,
cryptography offers a robust set of techniques which counteract
malicious intents and protect legitimate users. However, relying
only on cryptography to achieve security goals is essential,
it is insufficient. The most prominent example of this is the
Needham-Schroeder protocol that had been deemed to be
a secure protocol until it was paralyzed by a man-in-the-
middle attack seventeen years after its first utilization. Hence,
the need for analytical methods of cryptographic protocols’
verification is widely accepted. Several methods have been
developed and varied models for their verification have been
proposed as well. Although promising efforts, the obtained
results remains mixed, and this is plausible since that proving
the correctness of cryptographic protocols is generally an
undecidable problem [1]–[3]. In this paper, we focus on
two recent static methods, namely, the interpretation-functions
and witness-functions. Both transform the correctness problem
(regarding the secrecy property) into a problem of protocol
growth. They emit sufficient conditions on the metrics, that
measure the security level of each atomic message exchanged
in the protocol, and on the protocol itself, to deduce that it
is an increasing protocol and consequently could be declared
correct. Here, we show that the witness-functions are more
efficient than the interpretation-functions in proving secrecy
in cryptographic protocols. The analysis takes place in a role-
based specification [4]. We firstly extract the roles of each
agent in the protocol. Then from these roles, we define the
generalized roles according to the knowledge of each agent,
while unknown messages are substituted by variables. In both
analyses, we adopt the Dolev and Yao [5] conditions. We
suppose that the intruder has the total control over the network:
intercepting, blocking, forging and redirecting messages, any-
thing except decrypting the message without possessing the
decryption key. All the notations used in this paper are given
in [6]. We refer the reader to carefully take note of them before
further reading.
II. PAPER ORGANIZATION
This paper is organized as follows:
1) In Section III , we remind an important result: increasing
protocols are correct for secrecy. We exhibit few con-
ditions that must be satisfied by the functions used to
evaluate the level of security of atomic messages;
2) In Section V, we present the interpretation-functions [7]–
[10] , their way of evaluating atomic messages and their
way of treating variables;
3) In Section V, we present the witness-functions [6], [11]–
[17], their way of evaluating atomic messages and their
way of treating variables. We highlight their lower bounds
and upper bounds and their usage of derivation to reduce
variable impact;
4) In Section VI, we analyze an ad-hoc protocol by both
interpretation-functions and witness-functions. We show
that it could be proven correct by the witness-functions
but not by the interpretation-functions. In Section we
explain why that has happened and we explain why
witness-functions are more precise than interpretation-
functions;
5) In Section X, we conclude and we introduce to the future
avenues of our research.
III. CORRECTNESS OF INCREASING PROTOCOLS
We remind here a crucial result: ”A protocol is correct for
secrecy when we analyze it with a safe function and we show
that it is increasing”.
A. Safe Functions
Definition 1: (Well-Formed Function)
F (α, {α}) = ⊥
F (α,M1 ∪M2) = F (α,M1) ⊓ F (α,M2)
F (α,M) = ⊤, if α /∈ A(M)
Definition 2: (Full-invariant-by-intruder Function)
M |=C m⇒ (F (α,m) ⊒ F (α,M)) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq).
A function F is safe iff it is well-formed and full-invariant-
by-intruder.
Definition 3: (F -Increasing Protocol) A protocol p is F -
increasing iff: ∀R.r, F (α, r+σ) ⊒ pαq ⊓ F (α,R−σ)
Theorem 1: (Secrecy of Increasing Protocols) If F is a safe
function and p is an F -increasing protocol then p is correct
for secrecy.
IV. INTERPRETATION-FUNCTIONS
Houmani et al. [7]–[10] defined two functions called
interpretation-functions: DEK and DEKAN. These functions
safely evaluate the level of security of any atomic message.
They operate on any message either it contains variables or it
is a ground term. The variables are treated the same way as the
ground atoms. The function DEK selects the direct encryption
key of an atomic message α, that returns the identity of agents
that know the reverse form of that key from the context. The
function DEKAN returns in addition to the identity of agents
that know the reverse form of the direct key in the context, all
the neighbors of α encrypted with that key. For example, we
have:
• DEK(α, {α.C.X}kab) = pk
−1
ab q = {A,B}
• DEKAN(α, {α.C.X}kab) = {C}∪{X}∪pk
−1
ab q = {C}∪
{X} ∪ {A,B} = {C,X,A,B}
Where X is a variable. The notation X refers to the set of
agent identities in X after being substituted, which is only
known at runtime. Please notice that the function DEKAN is
not variable free (i.e. X is among the returned values). Now
that we have these two functions, it is possible to evaluate
the security level of any atom in any message. Hence, we can
compare the level of security levels on sent messages with
those in received messages and check whether a protocol is
increasing or not. Theorem 1 establishes its correctness if it is
shown increasing.
V. WITNESS-FUNCTIONS
The witness-functions have been proposed by Fattahi et
al in [6], [11], [16], [17]. First, we define six functions
F IKMAX , F
IK
IK , F
IK
N , F
EK
MAX , F
EK
EK , and F
EK
N and we prove that
they are safe functions. For lack of space, we will focus on the
function F IKMAX only and we refer to it as F . This function F
operates on ground terms only and does not deal with variables.
To rank the security level of an atom α in a message m, this
function selects the reverse key of the innermost protective key,
and returns the identity of agents that are allowed to know this
key in the context, in addition to all the neighbor identities of α
in m encrypted with this key. The innermost protective key is
not necessarily the direct key but the most internal encryption
key that has a security level superior that the security level
of α given in the context. This function is not very useful in
practice because a static analysis should take in consideration
variables. To deal with variables, we use the derivative form
of F instead of F .
Definition 4: (Derivative Function)
F ′(α,mσ) = F (α, ∂[α]mσ) =


F (α, ∂m) if α ∈ A(∂m),
F (X, ∂[X]m) if α /∈ A(∂m)
and α = Xσ, ∀σ
Since F ′(α,mσ) does not depend on substitution (i.e the
run σ), we denote it simply by F ′(α,m). Although the
derivative function F ′ eliminates the effect of variables, it
is not yet good enough to analyze protocols. For example,
for a valid trace m = {α.A.B}kcd having two sources
m1 = {α.A.X}kcd and m2 = {α.Y.B}kcd (X and Y are
variables), it may return two different images (two security
levels). For instance,
• F ′(α, {α.A.X}kcd) = F (α, {α.A.❩X}kcd) =
F (α, {α.A}kcd) = {A,C,D}
• F ′(α, {α.Y.B}kcd) = F (α, {α.❅Y .B}kcd) =
F (α, {α.B}kcd) = {B,C,D}
For that, we define the witness-function. A witness function
takes F and the protocol p as parameters, then looks for all
the sources of a ground term mσ in the finite set MGp , then
applies F ′ to all of them, and finally returns the minimum.
This minimum is obviously unique.
Definition 5: [Witness-Function]
Wp,F (α,mσ) = ⊓
{(m′,σ′)∈M˜Gp⊗Γ|m
′σ′=mσ}
F ′(α,m′σ′)
Using a witness-function roughly is not realistic since we
cannot predict all the valid traces mσ and their sources in
the protocol statically. For that, we bind witness-function into
two bounds that do not depend on substitution (i.e on σ).
The upper bound is F ′(α,m) and returns the smallest set of
principal identities for any α in m whereas the lower bound,
which is ⊓
{(m′,σ′)∈M˜Gp⊗Γ|m
′σ′=mσ′}
F ′(α,m′σ′)), returns the largest set of
identities from all the possible sources of m in the protocol
(the messages that are unifiable with m). Considering these
facts and Theorem 1, the theorem of secrecy decision with a
witness-function becomes as follows.
Theorem 2: [Decision for Secrecy]
p is correct with respect to secrecy if: ∀R.r, ∀α ∈ A(r+), we
have:
⊓
{(m′,σ′)∈M˜Gp⊗Γ|m
′σ′=r+σ′}
F ′(α,m′σ′) ⊒ pαq ⊓ F ′(α,R−)
This theorem is the one used to prove that a protocol is
increasing or not. Its correctness for secrecy follows. Please
note that when we say that we run an analysis with a witness-
function, we rather mean an analysis using the two bounds of
the witness-function, not with the witness-function itself.
VI. PROTOCOL DEFINITION AND CONTEXT SETUP
We analyze the protocol defined by p in Table I for secrecy.
The aim of our analysis is to show that p does not divulge the
secret sec, supposed to be shared between A and S only. We
show that the interpretation-functions fail, whereas a witness-
function succeeds.
TABLE I
PROTOCOL DEFINITION
p :: 〈1, A→ S : {A.Na.S.B}ks〉.
〈2, S → B : {B.A.S.Na}kb .{A.B.S.{S.sec}ka}kb 〉.
〈3, B → A : {B.{S.sec}ka .A.Na.S}ka〉
The role-based specification of p is RG(p) =
{AG, BG, SG}, where the generalized role AG of A
is as follows:
AG = 〈i.1, A → I(S) : {A.N
i
a.S.B}ks〉.
〈i.2, I(B) → A : {B.{S.X}ka .A.N
i
a.S}ka〉
The generalized role BG of B is as follows:
BG = 〈i.1, I(S) → B : {B.A.S.Y }kb .{A.B.S.Z}kb〉.
〈i.2, B → I(A) : {B.Z.A.Y.S}ka〉
The generalized role SG of S is as follows:
SG = 〈i.1, I(A) → S : {A.T.S.B}ks〉.
〈i.2, S → I(B) : {B.A.S.T}kb .{A.B.S.{S.sec}ka}kb 〉
Let us have a context of verification such that:
pkaq = pkbq = pksq = ⊥ (public keys);
pk−1a q = {A}; pk
−1
b q = {B}; pk
−1
s q = {S} (private keys);
pN iaq = {A,B, S} (nonce shared between A,B and S);
psecq = {A,S} (secret shared between A ans S only);
∀ agID ∈ I, p agID q = ⊥ (agents’ identities are public);
The variables are denoted by X , Y , Z and T in the
generalized roles.
VII. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS WITH THE
INTERPRETATION-FUNCTIONS
For the sake of conciseness, we do not analyze the en-
tire protocol. We analyze just the generalized role of B
where the Interpretation-Functions fail to show the growth
of the protocol. In that generalized role, B receives R− =
{A.S.Y }kb .{A.B.S.Z}kb and sends r
+ = {B.Z.A.Y }ka .
A. Analysis with the DEK function
1) Receiving step: DEK(Y,R−) =
DEK(Y, {B.A.S.Y }kb .{A.B.S.Z}kb) =
DEK(Y, {B.A.S.Y }kb) ⊓ DEK(Y, {A.B.S.Z}kb) =
pk−1b q ⊓ ⊤ = pk
−1
b q = {B}
2) Sending step: DEK(Y, r+) =
DEK(Y, {B.Z.A.Y.S}ka) = pk
−1
a q = {A}
As we can see, we cannot obtain the result DEK(Y, r+) ⊒
pY q ⊓ DEK(Y,R−). So, the DEK function fails.
B. Analysis with the DEKAN function
1) On receiving: DEKAN(Y,R−) =
DEKAN(Y, {B.A.S.Y }kb .{A.B.S.Z}kb) =
DEKAN(Y, {B.A.S.Y }kb) ⊓
DEKAN(Y, {A.B.S.Z}kb) = pk
−1
b q ⊓ {B,A, S} ⊓ ⊤ =
pk−1b q ⊓ {B,A, S} = {B} ∪ {B,A, S} = {A,B, S}
2) On sending: DEKAN(Y, r+) =
DEKAN(Y, {B.Z.A.Y.S}ka) = pk
−1
a q∪ {B,Z,A, S} =
{B,Z,A, S}
As we can see, we cannot obtain the result DEKAN(Y, r+) ⊒
pY q⊓DEKAN(Y,R−). So, the DEKAN function fails, as well.
VIII. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS WITH THE WITNESS-UNCTIONS
Let F = F IKMAX ; Wp,F =Wp,F IKMAX ;
We denote by Υp,F (α,m) the lower bound
⊓
{(m′,σ′)∈M˜Gp⊗Γ|m
′σ′=mσ′}
F ′(α,m′σ′) of the witness-function
Wp,F (α,m).
The set of encryption patterns generated by p is M˜Gp =
{{A1.NA1 .S1.B1}KS1 , {B2.{S2.X2}KA2 .A2.NA2 .S2}KA2 ,
{B3.A3.S3.Y3}KB3 , {A4.B4.S4.Z4}KB4 ,
{B5.Z5.A5.Y5.S5}KA5 ,
{A6.T6.S6.B6}KS6 , {B7, A7.S7.T7}KB7 ,
{A8.B8.S8.{S8.sec8}KA8}KB8}
The renamed variables in M˜Gp are denoted by
X2, Y3, Z4, Z5, Y5, T6 and T7;
A. Analysis of the Generalized Roles of A
According to the generalized role of A, an agent A may
take part in some session Si in which he receives nothing (i.e.
ǫ) and sends the message {A.N ia.S.B}ks . This is described by
the following rule:
Si :
ǫ
{A.N ia.S.B}ks
-Analysis of the messages exchanged in Si:
1- For N ia:
a- Receiving step: R−
Si
= ǫ (when receiving, we use the
upper bound)
F ′(N ia, R
−
Si
) = F (N ia, ∂[N
i
a]ǫ) = F (N
i
a, ǫ) = ⊤ (1)
b- Sending step: r+
Si
= {A.N ia.S.B}ks (when sending , we
use the lower bound)
Since {A.N ia.S.B}ks is a ground term (no variable in), then
we have: Υp,F (N
i
a, {A.N
i
a.S.B}ks) = F (N
i
a, {A.N
i
a.S.B}ks)
Since F = F IKMAX , we have:
F (N ia, {A.N
i
a.S.B}ks) = pk
−1
s q ∪ {A,S,B}. Then:
Υp,F (N
i
a, {A.N
i
a.S.B}ks) = {A,S,B} (2)
2- Conformity with Theorem 2:
From (1) and (2) and since pN iaq = {A,B, S} in the
context, we have:
Υp,F (N
i
a, r
+
Si
) ⊒ pN iaq ⊓ F
′(N ia, R
−
Si
) (3)
Then, the generalized role of A respects Theorem 2. (I)
B. Analysis of the generalized roles of B
According to the generalized role of B, an agent B
participates in a session Si in which he receives the mes-
sage {B.A.S.Y }kb .{A.B.S.Z}kb and sends the message
{B.Z.A.Y.S}ka . This is described by the following rule:
Si :
{B.A.S.Y }kb .{A.B.S.Z}kb
{B.Z.A.Y.S}ka
1-∀Z:
a- Receiving step: R−
Si
= {B.A.S.Y }kb .{A.B.S.Z}kb
(when receiving, we use the upper bound)
F ′(Z,R−
Si
) = F ′(Z, {B.A.S.Y }kb .{A.B.S.Z}kb)
= F (Z, ∂[Z]{B.A.S.Y }kb .{A.B.S.Z}kb)
= F (Z, {B.A.S}kb .{A.B.S.Z}kb)
= F (Z, {B.A.S}kb) ⊓ F (Z, {A.B.S.Z}kb)
= ⊤ ⊓ F (Z,{A.B.S.Z}kb)
= F (Z, {A.B.S.Z}kb)
= pk−1
b
q ∪ {A,B, S}
= {A,B, S}
(4)
b- Sending step: r+
Si
= {B.Z.A.Y.S}ka (when sending ,
we use the lower bound)
∀Z.{(m′, σ′) ∈ M˜Gp ⊗ Γ|m
′σ′ = r+
Si
σ′}
= ∀Z.{(m′, σ′) ∈ M˜Gp ⊗ Γ|m
′σ′ = {B.Z.A.Y.S}kaσ
′}
= {({B5.Z5.A5.Y5.S5}KA5 , σ
′
1)} such that:
σ′1 = {B5 7−→ B,Z5 7−→ Z,A5 7−→ A, Y5 7−→ Y,
S5 7−→ S,KA5 7−→ ka}
Υp,F (Z, {B.Z.A.Y.S}ka)
= {Definition of the lower bound of the witness-function}
F ′(Z, {B5.Z5.A5.Y5.S5}KA5σ
′
1)
= {Setting the static neighborhood}
F ′(Z, {B.Z5.A.Y.S}kaσ
′
1)
= {Definition 4}
F (Z5, ∂[Z5]{B.Z5.A.Y.S}ka)
= {Derivation}
F (Z5, {B.Z5.A.S}ka)
= {Since F = F IKMAX}
pk−1a q ∪ {B,A, S} = {A,B, S}
Then, we have:
Υp,F (Z, {B.Z.A.Y.S}ka) = {A,B, S} (5)
2- ∀Y :
a- Receiving step: R−
Si
= {A.S.Y }kb .{A.B.S.Z}kb (when
receiving, we use the upper bound)
F ′(Y,R−
Si
) = F ′(Y, {B.A.S.Y }kb .{A.B.S.Z}kb)
= F (Y, ∂[Y ]{B.A.S.Y }kb .{A.B.S.Z}kb)
= F (Y, {B.A.S.Y }kb .{A.B.S}kb)
= F (Y, {B.A.S.Y }kb ) ⊓ F (Y, {A.B.S}kb)
= F (Y, {B.A.S.Y }kb ) ⊓ ⊤
= F (Y, {B.A.S.Y }kb )
= pk−1
b
q ∪ {B,A, S}
= {A,B, S}
(6)
b- Sending step: r+
Si
= {B.Z.A.Y.S}ka (when sending ,
we use the lower bound)
∀Y.{(m′, σ′) ∈ M˜Gp ⊗ Γ|m
′σ′ = r+
Si
σ′}
= ∀Y.{(m′, σ′) ∈ M˜Gp ⊗ Γ|m
′σ′ = {B.Z.A.Y.S}kaσ
′}
= {({B5.Z5.A5.Y5.S5}KA5 , σ
′
1)} such that:
σ′1 = {B5 7−→ B,Z5 7−→ Z,A5 7−→ A, Y5 7−→ Y,
S5 7−→ S,KA5 7−→ ka}
Υp,F (Y, {B.Z.A.Y.S}ka)
= {Definition of the lower bound of the witness-function}
F ′(Y, {B5.Z5.A5.Y5.S5}KA5σ
′
1)
= {Setting the static neighborhood}
F ′(Y, {B.Z.A.Y5.S}kaσ
′
1)
= {Definition 4}
F (Y5, ∂[Y5]{B.Z.A.Y5.S}ka)
= {Derivation}
F (Y5, {B.A.Y5.S}ka)
= {Since F = F IKMAX}
pk−1a q ∪ {B,A, S} = {A,B, S}
Then, we have:
Υp,F (Y, {B.Z.A.Y.S}ka) = {A,B} (7)
3- Conformity with Theorem 2:
From (4) and (5), we have:
Υp,F (Z, r
+
Si
) ⊒ pZq ⊓ F ′(Z,R−
Si
) (8)
From (6) and (7), we have:
Υp,F (Y, r
+
Si
) ⊒ pY q ⊓ F ′(Y,R−
Si
) (9)
From (8) and (9), we have: the generalized role of B
respects Theorem 2. (II)
C. Analysis of the generalized roles of S
According to the generalized role of B, an agent
B participates in a session Si in which he receives
the message {A.T.S.B}ks and sends the message
{B.A.S.T }kb.{A.B.S.{S.sec}ka}kb . This is described
by the following rule:
Si :
{A.T.S.B}ks
{B.A.S.T }kb .{A.B.S.{S.sec}ka}kb
1- ∀T :
a- Receiving step: R−
Si
= {A.T.S.B}ks (when receiving,
we use the upper bound)
F ′(T, {A.T.S.B}ks) = F (T, ∂[T ]{A.T.S.B}ks)
= F (T, {A.T.S.B}ks)
= pk−1s q ∪ {A, S,B}
= {A,B, S}
(10)
b- Sending step: r+
Si
= {B.A.S.T }kb.{A.B.S.{S.sec}ka}kb
(when sending , we use the lower bound). We have:
Υp,F (T, r
+
Si
) = Υp,F (T, {B.A.S.T}kb .{A.B.S.{S.sec}ka}kb)
= Υp,F (T, {B.A.S.T}kb)⊓
Υp,F (T, {A.B.S.{S.sec}ka}kb )
= Υp,F (T, {B.A.S.T}kb) ⊓⊤
= Υp,F (T, {B.A.S.T}kb)
(11)
∀T.{(m′, σ′) ∈ M˜Gp ⊗ Γ|m
′σ′ = r+
Si
σ′}
= ∀T.{(m′, σ′) ∈ M˜Gp ⊗ Γ|m
′σ′ = {B.A.S.T }kb}kbsσ
′}
= {({A7.S3.Y1}KB2 , σ
′
1)} such that:
σ′1 = {B7 7−→ B,A7 7−→ A,S7 7−→ S, T7 7−→ T,KB7 7−→ kb}
Υp,F (T, {B.A.S.T }kb)
= {Definition of the lower bound of the witness-function}
F ′(T, {B7.A7.S7.T7}KB4σ
′
1)
= {Setting the static neighborhood}
F ′(T, {B.A.S.T7}kbσ
′
1)
= {Definition 4}
F (T7, ∂[T7]{B.A.S.T7}kb)
= {Derivation}
F (T7, {B.A.S.T7}kb)
= {Since F = F IKMAX}
pk−1b q ∪ {B,A, S} = {A,B, S}
Then, we have:
Υp,F (T, {B.A.S.T }kb) = {A,B, S} (12)
2- For the secret sec:
a- Receiving step: R−
Si
= {A.T.S.B}ks (when receiving,
we use the upper bound)
F ′(sec, {A.T.S.B}ks) = F (sec,{A.S.B}ks)
= ⊤
(13)
b- Sending step: r+
Si
= {B.A.S.T }kb.{A.B.S.{S.sec}ka}kb
(when sending , we use the lower bound)
Υp,F (sec, r
+
Si
) = Υp,F (sec,{B.A.S.T}kb .
{A.B.S.{S.sec}ka}kb )
= Υp,F (sec,{B.A.S.T}kb)⊓
Υp,F (sec,{A.B.S.{S.sec}ka}kb )
= ⊤ ⊓Υp,F (sec, {A.B.S.{S.sec}ka}kb )
= Υp,F (sec,{A.B.S.{S.sec}ka}kb )
(14)
Since {A.B.S.{S.sec}ka}kb) is a ground term, we have
directly:
Υp,F (sec, {A.B.S.{S.sec}ka}kb ) =
F (sec,{A.B.S.{S.sec}ka}kb ) =
{Since F = F IKMAX}
pka
−1
q ∪ {S} = {A,S}
(15)
3- Conformity with Theorem 2:
From (10) and (12), we have:
Υp,F (T, r
+
Si
) ⊒ pTq ⊓ F ′(T,R−
Si
) (16)
From (13) and (15), we have:
Υp,F (sec, r
+
Si
) ⊒ psecq ⊓ F ′(sec,R−
Si
) (17)
From (16) and (17), we have: the generalized role of S respects
Theorem 2. (III)
From (I) and (II) and (III), we conclude that: p respects
Theorem 2. So it is increasing, then, it is correct for secrecy.
(IV)
IX. RESULTS, INTERPRETATION AND RELATED WORKS
As a result of our analysis, one witness-function succeeds
in demonstrating the correctness of the protocol p for secrecy,
whereas the two interpretation-functions fail to do so. Indeed,
the witness-functions have two major advantages compared to
the interpretation-functions. On the one hand, the incorporated
derivation in the upper bound of a witness-function precludes
variables from playing any role in the received messages.
On the other hand, variables in sent messages are carefully
rummaged by the lower bound. These variables sometimes
contain odd identities, interpreted as an intrusion, but often
they do not, as it was the case in our protocol. This tightly
depends on the protocol structure. As for the interpretation-
functions, they treat variables with naivety. They just return
their content (i.e. agent identities) with no further inspection.
This may often constitute an obstacle in showing the protocol
growth, then, its correctness. A classical scenario on which
the interpretation-function DEKAN always fails is when an
atomic secret α is received with a variable X as a neighbor,
and sent with another variable Y as a neighbor. In that case,
there is no hope to prove the growth of the protocol. Besides,
in case of an analysis failure with a witness-function, we can
figure out which encryption pattern causes this failure, and
hence, we understand where and why a potential flaw may
occur, if any. This indicates us with precision which item we
have to modify in the protocol structure so that it becomes
increasing, as well. The interpretation-functions do not have
this capability to precisely explain why a flaw arises. They
just give a raw and fuzzy indication about it. This indication is,
in several cases, not helpful or even misleading. According to
our experience, the false positive ratio related to interpretation-
functions is much higher than the one related to the witness-
functions. However, this precision has its cost. On the one
hand, the protocol analysis with a witness-function is slower
than the analysis with an interpretation-function. On the other
hand, analyzing a protocol with a witness-function is sensitive
to multi-protocol environments. In contrast, analyzing it with
an interpretation-function is not, as these latter are universal.
X. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have exhibited a comparative study be-
tween witness-functions and interpretation-functions through-
out a detailed analysis of an ad hoc protocol. We man-
aged to show that the witness-functions may very much
succeed where the interpretation-functions failed. In a future
work, we will provide the formal proof that the witness-
functions mask the interpretation-functions. That means, we
will formally prove that, when the witness-functions fail,
the interpretation-functions necessarily fail, and when the
interpretation-functions succeed, the witness-functions neces-
sarily succeed. This will be the final step toward the depreca-
tion of the interpretation-functions.
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